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The Young Parsons
and the Mature Habermas
JAMES J. CHRISS

Throughout his career Parsons steadfastly clung to a multiperspectival approach that attempted to avoid the one-sided dogmatism of those systems of
thought that happened to be in ascendancy during any particular disciplinary
epoch. 58 During his Amherst days and beyond, Parsons was confronted with the
ideas of unitary evolution, empiricism, positivism, organicism, and neoclassical
economics, as well as the equally one-side reaction to the latter, namely unorthodox institutional economics. S9
This approach to social explanation was certainly evident in Parsons's Amherst
papers. In his "Theory of Human Behavior in its Individual and Social Aspects,"
Parsons stressed that prevailing mechanistic and behavioristic systems of thought
may not be appropriate for ethics and human behavior in light of cumulated
knowledge ("facts"). Parsons is careful not to let the idea of the importance of
"habit forming influences" on individual behavior lead him to embrace uncritically
the organicism that was still prevalent during his time. Later Parsons got into an
expanded discussion of culture, and especially the importance of cultural diffusion and convergence, to explain change and evolution of social systems (p. 15).
Parsons's goal here is to emphasize that explanations of human society must
move beyond unilinear models, whether based on individual habit (e.g., utilitarianism or behaviorism) at one extreme, or the power of institutions or culture
over the individual (e.g., institutional economics) at the other.
On page 23 Parsons stated that " ... there is no reason to make any radical
distinction in kind between habits of thought and technological habits. We are
one organism, not two, and viewed from one angle we are physical, from another mental, from another moral." This is extremely important; Parsons was
attempting to overcome the overly simplistic idea that there are two social
realities, namely the individual and society (the now famous and still unresolved
"micro-macro" debate).
It is noteworthy also that the entire basis of Habermas's (1984, 1987) theory
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of communicative action banks on the distinctions Parsons made some sixty
years previously, namely Habermas's notion of the universal validity claims underlying all speech (or speech acts). The three dimensions (or analytical worlds)
corresponding to the three validity claims are the subjective world (the validity
claim of subjective truthfulness), the objective world (the validity claim of propositional truth), and the social world (the validity claim of normative rightness).
Of course, this makes sense only in postconventional (modern) societies, because prior to that time, persons often drew upon only one world in making
claims (such as appealing to tradition, the divine right of kings, aesthetics, religion, or whatever).
Habermas's penchant for grand, overarching theory was borrowed from Parsons, and Parsons himself had been earlier influenced by that unique German
brand of theorizing tracing back through Hegel and Marx, Simmel, Weber and
Mannheim. 60 In effect, the same logic underlying Habermas's analytic of the
three worlds and the three validity claims can be found in the pages of Parsons's
Amherst papers. Wearne (1989, p. 31) suggests that, influenced by the holism
of German Enlightenment thought, Parsons was led to conceive of the unity of
social explanation as hinging on the merging of three basic modal aspects of the
human organism-the physico-chemical, the psychological-mental, and the social-moral-aspects which had been driven apart or treated separately in utilitarian, behavioristic, or even institutionalist systems of thought (see also Carnic
1991).
In these postmodern times, where many observers are theorizing the end of
the subject, a loss of certitude in the veracity of our modern social institutions
(e.g., law, the family, science, the media), and especially an end to the grand
"metanarrative" of Enlightenment rationality (e.g., Lyotard 1984), Jurgen Habermas
stands almost as a lone voice in defense of the type of modernist social theorizing that Parsons championed. Habermas (1987) states for example that "no theory
of society can be taken seriously today if it does not at least situate itself with
respect to Parsons" (p. 199). But also in good Parsonian fashion, Habermas has
never been wholly enamored of Parsons's ideas (see, e.g., Chriss 1995). In other
words, just as Parsons established in his Amherst papers and beyond, Habermas
approaches prevailing systems of thought critically, with an eye toward improving upon those ideas (including Parsons's own) and incorporating what is useful
from them into his own evolving theoretical schema. 61
These undergraduate Amherst papers attest to the vision and importance of
Parsons's approach to social explanation. They also serve to mark a clear lineage
or continuity between the early stages of German enlightenment theorizing-of
which Parsons was an heir-and current efforts to fashion an improved theory
of society, the latter represented especially by Habermas's theory of communicative action.
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